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Recession Transgressions: Financial Mishaps that Led to the Credit Crisis
by Kyle Nemchek

- APRIL 2010 ABSTRACT: This paper explores the financial crisis of 2007-2010 and its causes, including:
questionable monetary policy, loose lending standards, the emergence of structured finance
products designed to conceal the true risk of subprime loans, a lack of independence and due
diligence on the part of credit rating agencies, and the failure of oversight bodies to properly
monitor or regulate the parties responsible for the crisis.

INTRODUCTION
I.

MONETARY POLICY & INTEREST RATES
Easy money in the wake of the 2001 recession created an economic boom, but a
sudden reversal of Federal monetary policy saw an increase in interest rates that
left homebuyers unable to pay down their adjustable rate mortgages.

II.

LENDING STANDARDS & SUBPRIME LOANS
Government directives designed to increase homeownership, along with reduced
lending standards and predatory lending practices, resulted in loans made to
unqualified homebuyers who ultimately defaulted.

III.

SECURITIZATION & STRUCTURED FINANCE
Mortgage originators sold the loans to investment banks, which repackaged the
notes into complex securities that appeared less risky than the underlying loans.
Off-balance-sheet conduits effected uninformed investors who were punished
when the component mortgages experienced defaults.

IV.

CREDIT RATING AGENCIES
Professional rating companies may have lacked independence and objectivity,
producing potentially biased and/or flawed analyses that failed to expose the true
risk of mortgage-backed securities.

V.

DEREGULATION & FEDERAL OVERSIGHT
Federal oversight agencies did not adequately regulate the credit markets. Tools
for monitoring and restraining speculative excesses were ineffective, underused,
or repealed altogether.
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INTRODUCTION
Congress is currently debating a financial regulatory reform package intended to prevent
the recent credit crunch, which is considered by many economists to be the worst financial crisis
since the Great Depression and from which the United States and world economies are still
recovering, from happening again. In order to develop a suitable mechanism for fixing the
system, it is important to first determine what broke it. This paper attempts to accomplish that by
identifying concrete actions taken by legislators, regulators, lenders, borrowers, investment
banks, investors, and insurers that collectively contributed to the credit crisis. Below is a
summary of the multiple causes of the near-collapse of the world financial system, which are
discussed in more detail throughout this paper.
Governmental policies aimed at increasing homeownership and a subsequent reduction of
lending standards across the board led to an explosion of new mortgage loans in the late 1990s
and early 2000s. Meanwhile, federal interest rate cuts designed to expand the availability of
credit facilitated the use of adjustable rate and exotic mortgage products that concealed the true
lifetime costs of the loans, while predatory lending practices and mortgage application fraud
brought even more home loans to ill-equipped borrowers. Mortgage originators then sold the
loans to government-sponsored enterprises and investment banks, which repackaged them into
complex securities that appeared less risky than their underlying components. Unfortunately for
investors, credit rating agencies had failed to accurately assess the quality of those securities, and
their flawed ratings convinced major Wall Street firms to take highly leveraged positions, which
had been made possible by a relaxation of capital reserve requirements and the repeal of
financial regulation passed in response to the Great Depression. Meanwhile, an unregulated
derivatives market permitted credit default swaps, which were effectively insurance policies on
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mortgage-backed securities, to be traded profusely without sufficient collateral to cover losses.
When interest rates reset, homeowners found themselves unable to pay back their loans. Lenders
were left with houses that had decreased in value, investment banks and investors were stuck
with securities that they could not unload, and sellers of credit default swaps discovered
obligations that they lacked the capital to satisfy. With everyone looking to rid their portfolios of
toxic assets and no one willing to purchase them, credit markets became illiquid, or frozen,
resulting in what has become known as the credit crisis.

I. MONETARY POLICY & INTEREST RATES
In November 2002, then Governor and current Chairman of the Federal Reserve, Ben
Bernanke, spoke at economist Milton Friedman‘s ninetieth birthday regarding the responsibility
of central bankers for the Great Depression: ―You‘re right,‖ he pronounced, ―we did it. We‘re
very sorry. But thanks to you, we won‘t do it again.‖1 Two years later in Washington, D.C.
Bernanke discussed a phenomenon known as the Great Moderation, which referred to the
substantial decline in macroeconomic volatility that had occurred over the previous two decades
and for which he credited improvements in monetary policy.2 In hindsight, Bernanke‘s
confidence in the skill of the central banking system to mitigate financial instability may have
been misplaced, as even former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan admits, ―I do not
doubt that a low U.S. federal-funds rate in response to the dot-com crash…may have contributed
to the rise in U.S. home prices.‖3 Indeed, this section contends that easy money created by
interest rate cuts in the wake of the 2001 recession triggered a housing boom, but a sudden
reversal of federal monetary policy saw an increase in interest rates that left homebuyers unable
1
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to pay down their adjustable rate mortgages and led to the widespread sale of real estate amidst
declining housing prices.
The 2001 Recession & the Federal Response
During the final years of the twentieth century, stock market participants invested heavily
in Internet-based startups. In hindsight, experts have criticized investors for failing to evaluate
these companies in terms of traditional market criteria like profits or positive cash flow and for
speculating that technological advancements would lead to future returns on a massive scale as
part of a high-tech revolution known as the ―new economy‖.4 By the spring of 2000, equities
comprised sixty-percent of the financial assets in American households, representing the largest
exposure of individual investors to the stock market since September 1929.5 But when profits
ultimately failed to materialize, the dot-com bubble burst. Plunging technology stocks wiped out
hundreds of billions of dollars in market capitalization, and layoffs and bankruptcies became
commonplace across the e-commerce spectrum.6 To add to the devastation, the attacks of
September 11, 2001 inflicted heavy financial damage throughout the travel, tourism,
entertainment, and insurance industries while increased shipping, security, and insurance costs
permeated most sectors of the economy.7
One way in which the Federal Reserve can respond to a worsening economic situation is
by decreasing its target for the federal funds rate, the interest rate at which financial institutions
lend balances to one another, which the Federal Reserve can influence through the use of open
market operations.8 Lower interest rates make it easier for people to borrow in order to buy cars
and homes. Purchases of homes, in turn, increase the demand for other items, such as furniture
4
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and appliances, thus providing an additional boost to the economy. What‘s more, rate reductions
mean that consumers spend less on interest costs, leaving them with more of their income to
spend on goods and services.9 Accordingly, the Federal Reserve cut its federal funds rate target
eleven times over the course of 2001 from 6.5% to just 1.75%.10 Releases from the Federal Open
Market Committee cited concerns of tight conditions, lower consumer confidence, a persistent
erosion in current and expected profitability, slower growth abroad, and unusual forces
restraining demand, which collectively ―called for a rapid and forceful response of monetary
policy‖.11 But when economic recovery proved sluggish, the Federal Reserve continued to
decrease interest rates, lowering the federal funds rate target to 1.25% in November 2002 and to
1% in June 2003, where it remained for a year.12
Policy Criticism, Yield Curves & the Taylor Rule
Some observers questioned whether such aggressive policy measures were wise and
whether record-low interest rates could instigate a massive borrowing boom.13 Bernanke himself
acknowledged that policymakers worried that the sudden massive drop in rates limited the scope
for further monetary accommodation as the target interest rate approached its zero lower
bound.14 Further concern arose regarding the elevated degree of intervention, given that the
recession from March to November 2001 was short and mild and was only denoted a recession
due to the final contraction in economic activity caused by the world trade center attacks.15 In
fact, despite significant job losses in the year‘s last quarter, Yale professor William D. Nordhaus
termed the downturn ―the Mildest Recession‖, showing that in comparison to previous economic
9
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slumps, the negative growth for 2001 is almost indiscernible and is unmistakably the smallest
downward spike of any postwar recession.16
Another indication that the need for mediation may have been less than in prior
recessions was the favorable operating environment enjoyed by banks, as evidenced by yield
curves. The term yield curve refers to the relationship between the interest rates of short-term
and long-term fixed-income securities issued by the U.S. Treasury. Typically, short-term debt
instruments have lower yields due to the risks associated with time inherent to long-term
instruments. This leads to positive yield spreads and an upward sloping, or normal, yield curve,
which can suggest a positive long-term economic outlook.17 Because a bank‘s assets tend to have
longer maturities than its liabilities, a drop in short-term rates and the resulting steepening of the
yield curve enables banks to decrease borrowing costs and improve margins. In the 2001
recession, the yield curve steepened quickly and early. Its slope increased by 37% more in the
first quarter than during the same period of the 1990-91 recession, confirming that the interest
rate environment was more favorable for banks at the beginning of the 2001 downturn than it
was at the start of the prior recession and suggesting that such an aggressive federal response
may not have been warranted.18 Nevertheless, despite the tameness of the downturn, the
economy received the biggest monetary and fiscal boost in its history.19
Stanford economist John Taylor was also vocal in opposing the actions of the Federal
Reserve based on a monetary policy rule of his invention that stipulated how much the central
bank should change interest rates. The Taylor Rule, which had been based on policy evaluation
experiments, recommended that the Federal Reserve increase its federal funds target when the
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current inflation rate exceeded policymakers‘ longer-term inflation objectives or when current
output (usually real GDP) exceeded its potential.20 The actual federal funds rate, however, fell
beneath the values prescribed by the Taylor Rule by an average of 200 basis points from 2002 to
2006.21 Taylor would later write that interest rates were ―well below known monetary guidelines
that say what good policy should be based on historical experience‖, contending that keeping
interest rates on the track that had worked well in the previous two decades would have
prevented both the initial boom of home values and the ultimate housing bust.22
Adjustable-Rate Mortgages & the Housing Bubble
Whereas previous housing expansions have been attributed to increases in housing
demand or technological progress, the increased impact of monetary policy on home prices this
time around was due in part to changes in the methods of housing finance.23 Because federal
rates feed through to monthly mortgage payments more directly when the mortgage interest rate
is adjustable and tied to short-term rates, a rise in popularity of adjustable rate mortgage (ARM)
products may have rationalized a stronger effect of monetary policy on house prices. 24 An ARM
is a loan with an interest rate that changes periodically, usually in relation to an index. Lenders
typically charge lower initial interest rates for ARMs than for fixed-rate mortgages, but such
teaser rates are only valid for a limited time, and a borrower‘s payment may increase or decrease
due to changes in market rates after the initial discounted rate expires.25 Based on a tabulation of
average interest rates for prime borrowers from 2003 to 2006, as calculated by Freddie Mac, the
initial monthly payment was about 16% lower for ARMs than for fixed-rate 30-year mortgages.
Other, more exotic variations on the ARM, such as interest-only ARMs (resulting in an
20
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unchanged outstanding loan balance each month), negative amortization ARMs (in which the
initial payment did not even cover interest costs, thereby increasing the loan balance each
month), and pay-option ARMs (which gave the borrower considerable flexibility regarding the
size of monthly payments in the early stages of the contract) offered more striking comparisons
between ARMs and fixed-rate mortgages. Whereas the initial monthly payment of a standard
ARM represented 83.7% of a fixed-rate mortgage payment, the initial monthly payments of
negative amortization and pay-option ARMs constituted, at the onset, just 13.9% or less.26 The
attractive terms led to a surge in popularity of ARMs, which comprised just eight percent of
conventional loans in early 1981 before making up 36.6% of mortgages by March 2005.27
Were homebuyers blindly ignoring the impending resets of obviously impermanent teaser
rates? Not exactly, argued Yale professor Robert Shiller: ―People who bought ARMs realized
that interest payments would go up after some time. But they were not deterred because they
thought they would be compensated by rapidly increasing home prices and would be able to
refinance their mortgages at a lower rate.‖ Shiller advanced that lenders, too, believed in the
bubble, thus all-around ―irrational exuberance‖ led to an unsustainable buildup of already
elevated housing prices.28 Hence, after growing by a mere 8.3% from 1990 to the first quarter of
1997, home prices began a rapid ascent, peaking in the second quarter of 2006 at a level 132%
higher than at the start of 1997.29 Homeownership levels made a similar climb. Throughout the
three decades leading up to 1995, the homeownership rate fluctuated between 62 and 64 percent,
with little discernable trend, but jumped to 69% over the next ten years. Growth in
homeownership was so pronounced that during the same period, the amount of renters in the
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United States declined for the first time since World War II. This fact would be striking enough,
but also telling is that per capita income grew less during the spike than during the 1960s and
1970s.30 With incomes lagging and with trillions of dollars of ARMs scheduled to reset in 2007
and 2008, consumers were sure to face exploding monthly payments.31
The Recession
Nevertheless, reassured by apparently robust productivity growth, the Federal Reserve
initiated a series of increases to its federal funds rate target, reversing the recent cuts almost as
quickly as it had enacted them.32 Over two years from June 2004 to June 2006, the federal target
rose seventeen times from 1% to 5.25%.33 During that time, the previously discussed yield curve
became increasingly flat, as observed by Federal Reserve economist Jonathan H. Wright, who
noted that inversion of the curve is thought of as a harbinger of a recession.34 While Wright did
not seem to think that the flatness heralded a sharp slowdown at the time of his writing, the
short-term federal target ultimately exceeded long-term yields, and the slope of the curve entered
negative territory by the end of the year. Princeton economist Paul Krugman used models from
Wright‘s research to show that as of December 1, 2006, the probability of a recession occurring
during the next four quarters was between 68 and 74 percent,35 although Bernanke ―would not
interpret the currently very flat yield curve as indicating a significant economic slowdown to
come‖.36 The United States economy entered a recession a year later.37 As the short-term interest
rate returned to normal levels, housing demand fell rapidly. Delinquency and foreclosure rates
then rose sharply. Real GDP was flat in 2008, unemployment reached 9.5% the following
30
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summer, and the Dow Jones Industrial Average fell 55% from its peak of 14,279.96 in 2007 to
6,440.08 on March 9, 2009.38

II. LENDING STANDARDS & SUBPRIME LOANS
While housing prices were still increasing and homeownership was exceeding record
levels, mortgage lenders looked to earn additional profits by seeking a new type of customer: less
qualified homebuyers to whom credit was previously unavailable but who were willing to accept
higher interest rates and fees in order to secure a home loan. Government directives designed to
increase homeownership among poor and minority Americans provided further incentive for
lenders to weaken their traditional lending standards. The reduced standards, in conjunction with
certain predatory lending and borrowing practices, resulted in growing numbers of loans made to
unqualified or subprime homebuyers who ultimately defaulted.
Past Governmental Policies & Housing Discrimination
Homeownership had long been considered the foundation of neighborhood stability and
long-term wealth accumulation, thus governmental policies historically encouraged
homeownership by allowing taxpayers to deduct mortgage interest payments and state and local
real estate taxes from their incomes. But the government became much more directly involved in
promoting the American Dream when concerns regarding discrimination of traditionally
―underserved‖ populations in the mortgage market came to light.39 In 1977, for example, the
Community Reinvestment Act required banks to conduct business across their entire geographic
operating areas, preventing the pursuit of customers in a suburb while neglecting a downtown
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area.40 Such measures were deemed insufficient, however, when a 1992 study by the Federal
Reserve Bank of Boston concluded that race still played a significant role in lender decisions.41
Shortly thereafter, the Boston Fed distributed to loan originators a guideline for equal
opportunity lending with best practices designed to ―close the mortgage gap‖. Several telling
recommendations included in the guide seemed to indicate the lax direction that lending
standards would soon take: It was advised that property standards and minimum loan amounts be
checked for ―arbitrary‖ rules that might negatively affect applicants. Consideration should still
be given to applicants with obligation ratios significantly above industry standards. Lack of
credit history ―should not be seen as a negative factor‖, and the calculation of income should
even include temporary funding sources such as unemployment benefits and welfare payments.42
Serving Two Masters: Government-Sponsored Enterprises
To ensure the increased availability of credit to un-creditworthy persons, regulators
placed pressure on government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) including the Federal National
Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie
Mac). Fannie Mae & Freddie Mac were stockholder-owned, for-profit businesses erected by
Congress to help provide liquidity in secondary mortgage markets by purchasing mortgages from
loan originators. Because secondary mortgage markets can increase the availability of credit and,
consequently, the rate of home purchases, the GSEs could assist the government in achieving its
stated goal of bolstering homeownership. As a result, Congress chartered the organizations as
government-sponsored enterprises, which meant that their bonds were backed by the federal
government and that they could borrow funds at 50 to 75 basis points less than other private
lenders. This cheap access to credit propelled Fannie Mae & Freddie Mac to success, and the
40

Liebowitz
Bostic
42
―Closing The Gap: A Guide to Equal Opportunity Lending‖
41

11

share of all mortgages held by the firms rose from 25% in 1990 to 45% in 2001. But it also left
them destined to ―serve two masters‖—both their shareholders, who desired profitability, and the
federal government, which sought equality in lending.43
Eventually, the conflicting interests of these two principals became evident when the
GSEs were called upon to significantly broaden access to mortgage credit, despite such an action
potentially being fiscally unwise. The 1992 Federal Housing Enterprises Financial Safety and
Soundness Act (FHEFSSA) mandated that Fannie Mae & Freddie Mac increase their acquisition
of loans made to low-income borrowers and in areas underserved by private mortgage credit
institutions. Fannie Mae responded by announcing a trillion-dollar commitment in 1994 to help
10 million high-need families secure previously unattainable home loans as Freddie Mac pursued
similar initiatives.44
Subprime Lending
The less creditworthy borrowers affected by FHEFSSA had, in the past, been largely
relegated to the subprime lending market, which often charged higher interest rates and mortgage
fees than those assessed to prime borrowers. Moreover, GSEs were only permitted to purchase
prime loans on the secondary market, which meant that less money was available to mortgage
originators who extended credit to subprime debtors and that lenders were less willing to target
those borrowers. Distinctions between prime and subprime mortgages were evidenced by the
criteria for ―conforming‖ mortgages that could be purchased by Fannie Mae & Freddie Mac. A
conforming loan must have been made to a mortgagor with a FICO score above 660 (compared
to the low 600s or 500s for subprime), the loan-to-value ratio must have been less than or equal
to 80% (compared to close to or equal to 100% for subprime), the mortgagor‘s debt-to-income
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ratios must have been less than 28/36% (compared to 50% or more for subprime), and there must
have been appropriate documentation and verification of the mortgagor‘s income and assets
(compared to little or none for subprime).45
Increasing Government Influence on Lending Practices & Standards
To reduce the perceived neglect of subprime borrowers, legislators set their sights on
private banks through a 1995 strengthening of the Community Reinvestment Act. This revision
established objective criteria for determining whether a bank was adequately and equitably
providing credit to low-income earners. While in the past it had been sufficient for lenders to
demonstrate ―elaborate community lending efforts‖ (that they were searching for qualified
borrowers), banks were now obliged to prove ―an evenhanded distribution of loans‖ (that they
had actually issued a specified amount of requisite mortgages) across all income levels. 46 If a
bank failed to adhere to the new requirements, it could face direct legal challenges from the
Justice Department.47 As it turns out, many lenders discovered that the heightened commitments
were actually a boon to business. Countrywide Financial, for instance, used the Act revision as
an excuse to lower its underwriting standards and accept more credit applications.48 By 2000, it
would become the number one lender to minorities in America.49
Another governmental incentivizing of widespread credit availability appeared in the
form of the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). Beginning in
the mid-1990s, HUD commenced even more increases to the percentage of mortgages to lowincome households that Fannie Mae & Freddie Mac were required to hold in their portfolios. In
1996, the amount of new loans to be purchased by GSEs that had been issued to borrowers with
45
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incomes below the median was set at 40%. That level increased to 50% in 2000 and to 56% by
2008.50
Of course, banks and GSEs could not service these low-income borrowers by simply
offering traditional loans in larger numbers, for as discussed, Fannie Mae & Freddie Mac could
only purchase mortgages that conformed to certain standards regarding down payment and
income requirements, which mortgages issued to low-income households generally did not meet.
As the mandatory share of low-income mortgages increased, however, GSEs relaxed their
standards so that the new loans could be considered as conforming. Subsequent HUD edicts
required GSEs to accept loans with smaller down payments and larger loan-to-income and loanto-value ratios. These changes represented ―a new generation of affordable, flexible, and targeted
mortgages, thereby fundamentally altering the terms upon which mortgage credit was offered in
the United States from the 1960s through the 1980s.‖51
Evidence of Reduced Lending Standards
Subprime loans expanded from 9% of the mortgage market in 1996 to 20% in 2006.52
Fannie Mae & Freddie Mac, meanwhile, purchased $1 trillion in subprime and Alt-A (―nearprime‖ mortgages made to buyers that had less documentation or that possessed certain subprime
characteristics) loans from 2005 to 2007, representing 40% of their mortgage purchases made
during that period.53 Over the same time frame, 57.5% of the mortgages acquired by Fannie Mae
(61% for Freddie Mac) were issued to mortgagors with FICO scores below 620 while 62% of
Fannie Mae‘s mortgage procurement (58% for Freddie Mac) had a loan-to-value ratio greater

50

Wallison, 2008
Listokin
52
―Economists Brace for Worsening Subprime Crisis‖
53
Wallison, 2008
51

14

than 90%.54 Furthermore, between 2001 and 2006, the annual number of originated loans
increased by a factor of four, while the average loan size almost doubled. During the same
period, the use of fixed-rate mortgages declined from 33.2% to 19.9%, and the mean debt-toincome ratio of approved loan applicants broke 41%.55
The shrinking subprime-prime rate spread also signaled the deteriorating quality of new
loans. Interest rates on subprime mortgages were generally greater than those on prime
mortgages to compensate lenders for the additional default risk associated with subprime loans.
Amidst intensifying competition for mortgage origination, however, the subprime-prime rate
spread decreased substantially over time, dropping from a premium of near 3.5% in 2001 to just
above 0.75% in 2004.56 Likewise, the yield differential between subprime mortgages that were
one grade apart, which had been roughly 1% until 2003, was cut in half from 2004 to 2007.57
Mortgage fees also dropped from an average of 1% in 1997 to less than 0.5% in 2002.58 It
appears, at least in hindsight, that lenders were no longer being sufficiently compensated for the
additional risk inherent in subprime loans.
Another example of reduced lending standards and supplemental cause of the upsurge in
subprime loan issuances was the emergence of automated underwriting. New software systems
allowed mortgage lenders to cheaply and quickly screen out the riskiest applicants while
automatically approving the rest. At its introduction, automated underwriting was hailed by
lenders as a great cost-saver, reducing the average closing costs of a loan by $916.59 But
automation could be ―vulnerable‖, as it immediately accepted all loans that met the standards
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input by the software users.60 As those standards decreased, the default risk of accepted loans
increased. Previously mentioned Countrywide Financial employed automated underwriting to
double the number of loans it made monthly in 2004 to 150,000.61 By 2007, automation software
was being used to generate approximately 40% of all new subprime loans.62 Despite efficiency
gains, however, automated underwriting programs did not verify mortgagor income or inspect
the property under loan or exercise any type of due diligence befitting a loan officer. Losses due
to adverse selections made in this fashion could more than offset the cost-saving benefits of the
automation process63.
Predatory Lending & Borrowing
Apart from the lenders and GSEs that sought to expand credit access to low-income
families in order to placate housing discrimination, there also existed mortgage originators who
may have targeted subprime borrowers for less noble reasons. Abusive loan practices that
benefited lenders to the detriment of mortgagors were termed predatory lending. As approvals
grew immensely, it appeared that many of the terms were structured to result in ―seriously
disproportionate‖ net harm to borrowers. Examples included 1) loans made without regard to a
borrower‘s ability to repay, 2) loans with fees and interest rates in excess proportion to the risk
presented by the borrowers, 3) fraudulent or deceptive loans based on inflated appraisals or
empty promises of future, less costly refinancing, 4) loans that included mandatory arbitration
clauses, which prevented borrowers from seeking legal redress through the court system, and 5)
exploitative collection methods and unjustified fees during repayment.64 Even prior to signing,
some lenders deliberately withheld their rate sheets and other pricing information from
60
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customers, which impeded comparison shopping.65 Incentives to generate increased loan
volumes explained the somewhat counterintuitive practice of making loans to borrowers that
could not pay back the lender,66 as did the belief that house prices would continue to rise,
permitting lenders to recoup more than their principal by selling foreclosed properties at a profit
while assessing additional fees as part of the foreclosure process.67 One instance of predatory
lending that garnered national attention occurred in Baltimore and was perpetrated by Wells
Fargo Bank, which targeted predominately African-American neighborhoods with ―toxic‖ loans
that were allegedly ―designed to fail‖ and that resulted in foreclosures. A former loan officer
admitted to earning over $700,000 in a year for carrying out the firm‘s corporate policy of
lending to ill-equipped minority borrowers at unreasonable expense or under false pretenses.68
Yet lenders were not solely to blame for loans granted to undeserving parties. There was
also a significant incidence of mortgage application fraud, or predatory borrowing. When bad
loans eventually went sour, it was later discovered that as much as 70% of the defaults were on
loans with fraudulent misrepresentations on the original applications. For loans issued between
1997 and 2006, applications with misrepresentations were five times as likely to go into
default.69 Mortgage fraud was estimated to cost up to $6 billion dollars in 2005 alone.70
Moreover, suspicious activity reports relating to mortgage fraud filed with the Financial Crimes
Enforcement Network, an agency of the U.S. Treasury, increased by 1,411% between 1997 and
2005.71 The types of fraud were not elaborate. Many borrowers simply lied about their incomes,
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sometimes overstating the amount by a multiple of five.72 Others, who intended to flip a
mortgaged home for profit, stated that they planned to live in it instead. These assertions required
little to no documentation and went largely unchecked.73
Debt Explosion and the Inevitable Subprime Implosion
Between governmental policies aimed at curbing housing discrimination, underwriting
standards that were reduced in order to comply with those policies, and an expansion of
predatory lending and borrowing practices that occurred in pursuit of profit, household debt
ballooned. In 2003, homeowners borrowed a record $138 billion against the equity of their
homes. In 2004, around half of low-income families were spending at least 50% of their incomes
on housing.74 By 2009, interest payments alone consumed nearly 15% of the after-tax income of
American households.75 What‘s more, mortgage debt grew at a greater clip than home values.
While the average ratio of homeowners‘ equity compared to market value remained above 67%
through the 1980s and around 61% over the next two decades, it fell to 55% in the mid-2000s.76
Eventually, many of the country‘s massively leveraged households could no longer afford
to make their monthly mortgage payments and defaulted on their home loans. By the third
quarter of 2007, 42% of adjustable rate and 12% of fixed rate subprime mortgages had begun the
foreclosure process.77 When borrowers failed to pay, the mortgage originators who had lent them
money were forced to absorb sizable losses. American Business Financial Services, which had
lent a billion dollars in its penultimate year, filed for bankruptcy protection in January 2005
while Merit Financial, which had originated $2 billion from 2001 to 2006, fired 80% of its
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employees in May 2006.78 New Century Financial, the nation‘s second largest subprime lender,
which had also sold many its mortgages to securitizers, announced in February 2007 that it
would restate earnings for the first three quarters of 2006 because its allowance for recourse
obligations (the expected amount of mortgages it would be contractually compelled to
repurchase due to defaults) was grossly insufficient.79 Over the next two months it was forced to
stop originating new loans altogether and declared bankruptcy.80 HSBC, the largest subprime
lender, faced similar struggles, announcing loan impairment provisions of $10.6 billion for 2006
and $16 billion for 2007.81

III. SECURITIZATION & STRUCTURED FINANCE
Had mortgage lenders been the only parties with exposure to the subprime loan market,
the extent of the credit crisis might have been significantly reduced. Accompanying the rising
popularity of subprime loans, however, were new structured finance products that enabled many
other market players to capitalize on the risky notes, which had been repackaged into supposedly
safer securities that could be purchased and traded. Of course, the actual risk of subprime
positions turned out to be great, and when the market for subprime loans imploded, governmentsponsored enterprises that had issued mortgage-backed securities, investment banks that had sold
collateralized debt obligations, insurance companies that had guaranteed those obligations, and
investors who purchased them could no longer unload them in a frozen credit market and were
all forced to post substantial losses.
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Mortgage-Backed Securities
As previously mentioned, government-sponsored enterprises such as Fannie Mae &
Freddie Mac were instrumental in providing liquidity through secondary mortgage market
operations. GSEs accomplished this by purchasing loans from mortgage originators and reselling
them to investors as mortgage-backed securities (MBS).82 In 1970, the Government National
Mortgage Association, another GSE, first pooled similar mortgages together and sold them as
securities that represented claims on the mortgage payments from the pool. The mortgage
payments then passed through to the security holders, which most commonly were institutional
investors, wealthy individuals, and even the original lenders (who often preferred the more liquid
version of loan assets to the actual loans).83
MBS were beneficial for several reasons. First, they spread (shifted, really, as discussed
later) default risk across a larger class of investors and removed the loans from the balance sheets
of the lenders. This permitted mortgage originators to earn fee income from their underwriting
activities without being directly exposed to the inherent risk of the loans. Second, purchasers of
MBS gained access to more liquid and more diversified mortgage assets. While individual loans
required large amounts of principal and lengthy time commitments and could be risky in
isolation, MBS offered small pieces of groups of loans, which could be freely traded. Third,
GSEs were able to obtain vast sources of capital to finance their continued purchases of
mortgages, maintaining liquidity in the secondary mortgage markets and encouraging lending by
creditors. Lastly, because MBS were issued by GSEs, GSEs earned guarantee fees, and the
securities carried the implicit guarantee of the United States government.84
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Private-Label Securities
Securitization became the prevailing tool for the diversification and liquidation of
mortgage loans, and its success prompted intense competition from other financial institutions.
Indeed, the share of MBS issued by GSEs, which stood at a dominant 76% in 2003, fell to 43%
in 2006 due to the growth of private-label securities issued by major Wall Street firms.85 Top
issuers of private-label MBS included mortgage firm Countrywide Financial as well as
investment banks Lehman Brothers and Wells Fargo.86 Unlike MBS issued by GSEs, privatelabel issuances were not backed by the government, and they were not limited to including only
mortgages that conformed to federal requirements. This meant that private-label issuers could
issue MBS that represented claims on subprime and other risky loans, but it also became
necessary for the firms to develop methods for counteracting the elevated risk in order to
convince investors to purchase the securities. One way that financial institutions shielded
investors, at least cosmetically, from the risk of the underlying mortgages of MBS was through
overcollateralization. In this example of ―credit enhancement‖, the principal amount of the pool
of mortgages exceeded the principal value of the issued securities. Another credit enhancement
technique, known as excess spread, occurred when the interest payments on the underlying
mortgages exceeded the payments offered to purchasers of MBS.87 The excess was first used to
cover default losses, and if any spread was left, it could be used to build up a cushion against
future losses or to pay down the principal on senior bonds.88
Unquestionably the most popular tool for creating an apparently sheltered security out of
more vulnerable components was structured securitization, whereby underlying mortgages were

85

―The rise of private label‖
Rosen
87
―MBS Basics‖
88
Rosen
86

21

separated into different levels, called tranches, which were prioritized in how they absorbed
losses from the underlying portfolio. The senior tranche, at the top, was perceived to be the least
risky because it held first claim to mortgage payments and was protected from losses by the
tranches below it. As such, it offered the lowest interest rates. Any payments remaining after the
senior tranche requirements were fulfilled flowed to the junior, or mezzanine, tranche below it,
which earned slightly greater interest due to the greater likelihood of shortfalls. The bottom, or
equity, tranche—often referred to as ―toxic waste‖—was the first to absorb losses and thus
presented the greatest amount of risk, but successful performance by this tranche‘s underlying
assets could lead to high returns for investors. When losses did occur, they hit the lowest tranche
first until it was completely eroded; additional losses were directed at the mezzanine and finally
senior tranches. Collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), which pooled hundreds of individual
tranches from MBS, allowed investment banks to tailor securities with differing risk-return
profiles to different investors.89
A mathematical example helps to illustrate just how such structured securitization, or
subordination, could alleviate concerns of default risk among investors. Consider a scenario in
which a security contains a pool of just two loans, each with a face value of $1 and with a
probability of default of 10%. One loan represents the junior tranche and will absorb the first $1
of losses such that it will pay out $1 if both loans avoid default but $0 if either defaults. The
other loan represents the senior tranche and will only fail to pay out if both loans default. In this
example, the senior tranche will pay out either $1 or $0—the same as the underlying
mortgages—but, if the two probabilities of default are uncorrelated, the likelihood that the senior
tranche will fail to pay out is less than that of either loan by itself (1% vs. 10%). As more
securities are added to the mortgage pool, an increasingly greater fraction of tranches will have a
89
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lower probability of default than the average loan component. For instance, if a third bond is
added to the example, also with a 10% probability of default, and if the probabilities are
uncorrelated, the senior tranche will only fail to pay out if all three loans default, or 0.1% of the
time (0.13); the middle tranche will only fail to pay out if two or more loans default, or 2.8% of
the time (3C2 * 0.12 * 0.9 + 0.001), much less often than the 19% (1 – 0.92) default incidence of
the second bond in the previous example; and the bottom tranche will fail to pay out if any of the
loans default, or on 27.1% of occasions (1 – 0.93). And so, through the magic of subordination,
two-thirds of the issuance is repackaged into securities that appear significantly less risky than
the underlying loans.90 As MBS often contained thousands of mortgages and CDOs contained
hundreds of MBS, the percentage of seemingly low-risk tranches grew ever closer to 100%, and
securities that were backed by BBB components earned AAA ratings.91
Risk Sharing vs. Risk Shifting
Of course, these examples rest on an important assumption—that the probabilities of
default for the underlying mortgages are uncorrelated. This notion simply may not hold true.
Granted, the type of diversification offered by MBS can produce risk-reducing benefits when the
underlying risk is random. For instance, a home insurance company might diversify
geographically among policyholders to protect itself from the risk of a particular house burning
down since the likelihood of all insured houses catching fire simultaneously is infinitesimal. Risk
of default, on the other hand, can be much more systematic than risk of fire. Because mortgage
loans implicitly contain a put option that allows a borrower to sell a home back to the lender
when its value falls below the value of the mortgage, defaults often increase as house prices
decline. Prices tend not to decline in isolation, though, as the decline in value of one house can
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signal general problems that will similarly affect the values of surrounding houses.92 As such, the
probability of default for loans comprising MBS were likely correlated, and the benefits of
diversification were likely overstated. The deteriorating quality of subprime loans within MBS
augmented further the prospect of default.
Returning to the home insurance company example, when a single house is destroyed due
to fire, an insurer can use the proceeds from other insurance premiums to cover the loss, thus risk
is shared by policyholders. In the case of default risk, however, it is more appropriate to say that
risk is shifted, first from borrower to lender, then from lender to secondary market participants,
then to investment banks, insurers, and investors. Even within individual MBS or CDOs, risk is
shifted from the most senior to the junior tranches. Because risk could be passed on to the next
party at each stage of securitization, less incentive existed for loan originators and purchasers to
exercise due diligence regarding borrower quality or appropriateness of credit instruments. And
as we will see, credit rating agencies did a poor job assessing the true risk of MBS, allowing
securitizers to sell them at prices that did not reflect the issuer‘s lack of attentiveness. Mortgage
originators and investment banks thus had incentive and opportunity to cherry-pick loans while
leaving the worst to investors. Countrywide Financial President Stanford Kurland confessed,
―We‘re looking to hold only pristine product on the balance sheet.‖93 Such information
asymmetry created problems for investors, who could not examine loan applications firsthand
but who relied on the representations of issuers regarding the credit quality of borrowers.
Other particularly egregious risk-shifting tools including special purpose entities and
structured investment vehicles enabled banks and lenders to move the risk of the underlying
loans so that it was virtually invisible to outsiders. In fact, these conduits fell under the umbrella
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aptly called ―structured finance‖ because transactions were structured to isolate loan pools from
the original lenders or purchasers. In this process, mortgage originators and investment banks
established offshore entities that were owned by, but legally distinct from, the creators.94 Due to
the alleged independence of these entities, their assets and liabilities were kept separate from the
balance sheets of the sponsoring institutions. Conduits allowed the banks to sidestep capital
reserve requirements and invest more heavily in MBS and CDOs.95
Was this accounting treatment appropriate? Well, to assure investors of the soundness of
these entities, the establishing banks often committed to provide them with liquidity (in
extraordinary amounts) in case of need. While the commitments were not required to be shown
on a backer‘s balance sheet if its management considered it unlikely that the promises would be
called upon, it seems clear now that banks and lenders had provided at least implicit guarantees
regarding the health of subsidiaries under their ownership.96 At the end of 2008, off-balancesheet assets at the country‘s four largest banks—Bank of America, Citigroup, JPMorgan Chase,
and Wells Fargo—totaled $5.2 trillion.97 Citigroup CEO Chuck Prince infamously declared:
―When the music stops, in terms of liquidity, things will get complicated. But as long as the
music is playing, you‘ve got to get up and dance. We‘re still dancing.‖98 Other dancers, issuers
and investors alike, were caught unawares when the commitments were revealed to be large
enough to bankrupt many of the sponsoring banks.
Over-Exposure
Some investment banks did realize that they were the lenders of last resort for their
private-label issuances, which were not secured by the federal government. So to shift the risk
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burden one step further, issuers purchased credit default swaps (CDS) from insurers to protect
their MBS, CDOs, and SIVs. Sellers of CDS, in exchange for a premium, agreed to reimburse a
contract holder that suffered losses to its underlying assets and conferred the insurer‘s own credit
rating onto those assets. While CDS may have resolved, on the face of it, the matter of liability
for individual banks, the financial instruments created deeper problems for the credit market at
large. First, many CDS were offered as unregulated derivatives, which meant that guarantors
were not subject to the same capital requirements as monoline insurers and commitments greatly
exceeded the funds available to fulfill them. Also, CDS, like the securities they insured, could be
traded in over-the-counter markets with prices reflecting the perceived financial health of the
underlying assets. Moreover, the ―insurable interest‖ requirement, which limits most insurance
policies to parties that would be negatively affected by damage to the insured object, did not
apply, thus CDS shifted the focus of insurance contracts from protecting against loss to creating
opportunities for speculative gains. Multiple contracts could be purchased for the same
underlying asset, and the resulting overlap produced investors with significantly greater exposure
to loans than actually existed. At the end of 2008, the CDS market was valued at $67 trillion, but
the value of the component loans was only $15 trillion!99
As previously discussed, an increasing number of those loans significantly deteriorated in
quality, and when borrowers defaulted and mortgage originators went bankrupt, it spelled
disaster for everyone with exposure to subprime holdings. At the same time, lenders and banks
that had failed to disclose certain assets and liabilities realized enormous losses when failing
notes and obligations to SIVs appeared on their balance sheets. In October 2007 Merrill Lynch
reported a $7.9 billion loss on subprime positions and a $5.8 billion loss on its senior (the safest
tranche) CDOs. A month later, Citigroup announced a $1.8 billion loss, to which it added at least
99
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$8 billion in a subsequent disclosure. What‘s more, sellers of CDS were now liable for large
sums that did not exist. In the first quarter of 2008, two major loan insurers, Ambac and MBIA
announced losses of $5.2 and $3.5 billion, respectively. The fate of these companies, which had
guaranteed $2 trillion of debt, raised concerns of rapid contagion due to interdependency.100
Later that year, prominent investment bank Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy
protection due to debts of over $600 billion, marking the largest bankruptcy in United States
history.101 In bankruptcy examinations, it was discovered that Lehman had allegedly shifted $50
billion in troubled assets off its balance sheet to conceal the firm‘s true financial condition by
employing what has been called a Repo 105 maneuver. A repo, or repurchase agreement, occurs
when a borrower uses securities as collateral for a cash loan, which when fully paid back,
triggers the return of the securities to the borrower. Lehman, however, was able to avoid treating
such transactions as repos and to give the appearance of permanently ridding itself of failing
assets by narrowly tailoring the arrangements to satisfy the requirements of a sales deal. To
qualify for sales treatment, a firm must prove that it no longer controls the securities being
exchanged, usually by trading securities of significantly greater value than the cash received,
since it would be perceived as unlikely that the firm could or would buy them back. Accounting
guidance suggests that an exchange of securities in excess of 102% of the cash value denotes a
lack of control, thus Lehman structured its repo transactions at a level of 105%. However, it was
later revealed that the firm had no economic reason for doing so and that it had consistently used
a standard 105% level regardless of the deal, seemingly indicating that there existed a concerted
effort to disguise inevitable repurchases of volatile assets as permanent sales.102
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New discoveries have also surfaced that some asset-backed securities were intentionally
arranged to fail, much to the dismay of unsuspecting investors. As recently as April 2010, the
SEC charged investment bank Goldman Sachs with fraud relating to the structuring and
marketing of CDOs tied to subprime mortgages. The complaint alleges that the investment bank
failed to disclose fundamental information about some of its CDOs to investors, particularly the
role that a major hedge fund played in the portfolio selection process and the fact that the hedge
fund had taken a short position against the securities. Paulson & Co., one of the world‘s largest
hedge funds, purportedly paid Goldman Sachs to structure a transaction in which Paulson could
bet against mortgage securities that it had chosen based on their expected failure. With
knowledge of Paulson‘s undisclosed short interest, Goldman executives deliberately misled
institutional investors to purchase the CDOs now under investigation.103

IV. CREDIT RATING AGENCIES
How did we end up here? What would cause banks to acquire and securitize mortgage
loans of deteriorating quality? Why would investors purchase securities that they did not fully
understand? Where were the minds of insurers, who provided guarantees that greatly exceeded
their ability to follow through? Who was responsible for leading rational parties to make such
irrational yet enormous decisions? Certainly some fault must lie with the credit rating agencies,
whose ultimately flawed ratings stamped seals of approval on poor investments and propped up
the market for structured finance products by understating the inherent risk of mortgage-backed
securities and their components. A lack of competition, the absence of transparency, and
apparent conflicts of interest contributed to inaccurate or misleading ratings and poorly served
users who had relied on the rating services.
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The Gatekeepers
The primary function of credit rating agencies (CRAs) is to assess the creditworthiness
and the debt obligations of companies and their issuances. CRAs issue alphabetic credit ratings,
which represent opinions on the future ability, legal obligation, and willingness of obligors to
make full and timely payments on principal and interest to investors. Like public accounting and
securities research firms, CRAs facilitate the raising of capital by providing to individual
investors an independent, low-cost source of information regarding the reliability of issuers of
securities. Credit ratings greatly influence the decisions of investors in fixed-income vehicles and
determine the ability of issuers to obtain financing. By serving such a verification function,
CRAs have become known as external gatekeepers who act as reputational intermediaries by
evaluating issuers in order to protect outside investors.104
When gatekeepers perform their jobs well, they provide a useful service of pairing
investors with risk-appropriate instruments and keeping conservative portfolios free of toxic
components. Time, of course, has revealed that CRAs were notoriously inept at fulfilling this
role. Beginning in early 2007, increasing delinquencies on subprime mortgages raised concerns
about the ability of CRAs to accurately assess the quality of securitized obligations in the
structured finance market.105 The President‘s Working Group on Financial Markets would later
issue a policy statement identifying faulty ratings as one of the principal causes of financial
market turmoil.106 Likewise, the Financial Stability Forum blamed poor credit assessments for
both the buildup and the unfolding of the crisis.107 Indeed, as a result of the initial severe
underestimation of credit risks, recent changes in CRA ratings have been much more volatile and
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weighted toward downgrades than the historical record.108 Between Moody‘s and Standard &
Poor‘s, the world‘s two largest CRAs, $322 billion in mortgage securities were downgraded in
the last two quarters of 2007, and $1.58 trillion were downgraded in the first half of 2008.109
Dissatisfaction with perceived CRA incompetence led PIMCO (manager of the world‘s largest
mutual fund) analyst Bill Gross to scold rating agencies for being foolishly wooed by ―good
looking‖ but far from ―high-class‖ instruments bearing ―tramp stamp[s]‖.110
Despite their apparent lack of foresight, the ratings issued by CRAs effectively buoyed
the securitization market, which in turn provided much of their business. As structured finance
products became more advanced, unsophisticated investors required quality assurance about the
inherent complexity. For this reason, it became an axiom that ―securitization is, and always has
been, a rating-driven product.‖111 So crucial to the proliferation of structured products were the
credit ratings of CRAs that Pulitzer Prize winning journalist Thomas Friedman remarked: ―There
are two superpowers in the world today…there‘s the United States and there‘s Moody‘s Bond
Rating Service…and believe me, it‘s not clear sometimes who‘s more powerful.‖112 At the same
time that issuers were obviously dependent upon rating agencies, CRAs possessed an ―enormous
amount of self-interest vested in keeping the structured finance machine going‖.113 CRAs offered
up guidance on the more complex vehicles at a premium, charging almost three times as much
for ratings of securitized loans and derivatives than for ordinary corporate bond work. Moreover,
these ratings represented the largest business and growth driver for Fitch Ratings and accounted
for 40% of Moody‘s revenues.114 In effect, CRAs transitioned from gatekeepers to ―gate
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openers‖, issuing ratings that created and sustained a multi-trillion dollar structured finance
market.115
Causes of Low-Quality Ratings: Lack of Competition
The market for credit ratings has historically been directed by two major players,
Moody‘s and Standard & Poor‘s, with Fitch trailing in a distant third until recently. Together, the
three firms control around 98% of the entire rating agency business and issue more than 99% of
ratings for asset-backed and government securities.116 Such astounding market concentration has
led economists to describe the credit rating industry as ―curiously devoid of competition and
oversight‖.117 The problem has been compounded by what has been ingrained as a two-rating
norm, whereby standard practice for issuers of securities dictates obtaining ratings from two
different firms on each issue, the default pair almost always being Moody‘s and Standard &
Poor‘s.118 This measure means that the largest two CRAs have effectively no need to compete for
business and have been able to construct a ―partner monopoly‖.119 Such lack of competition has
resulted in the prominent CRAs employing generally similar (and ultimately flawed) rating
methodologies, not surprisingly attaining identical results, with little use for differing or
inventive approaches.120 Moreover, accusations of anticompetitive practices have been levied at
Moody‘s and Standard & Poor‘s by Fitch, which asserted that its older siblings had colluded in
attempting to squeeze it out of the structured finance market. The two giants had allegedly
engaged in notching, which involved lowering their ratings of or refusing to rate certain asset
pools unless the firms were recruited to rate a substantial portion of the assets in those pools.121
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How did the CRAs achieve their dominant positions in the first place? In 1975, the SEC
established a significant barrier to entry for the rating agency market by creating the designation
of nationally recognized statistical rating organizations (NRSROs).122 It became essential for any
firm wishing to become a viable CRA to first earn this title, which was viewed as the mark of a
real rating agency, but for which the approval process was considered ―unnecessarily
cumbersome and insufficiently transparent‖.123 The original NRSROs—Moody‘s, Standard &
Poor‘s, and Fitch—were still the only three firms to hold the designation almost thirty years
later, despite the dramatic increase in global reliance on credit ratings.124 CRAs also benefited
from heavily rating-dependent regulation. At least forty-four of the SEC‘s rules require the use
of credit ratings, the banking regulatory system calls for rating agencies to measure asset risk,
pension plans under the framework set by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 must be assessed by NRSROs, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners‘
Securities Valuation Office uses ratings to monitor insurance companies, and many state laws
and banking regulations compel the same. Likewise, ratings became just as hard-wired in private
arrangements, as minimum weighted average rating requirements and rating triggers emerged as
popular elements of private contracts.125 The ubiquity of ratings in financial regulation and
industry practice multiplied the demand for the service while the coveted label of NRSRO
reinforced the notion that only a select trio of agencies was qualified to complete the work. As
regulation, rather than reputation, became a fundamental source of business for CRAs, the big
firms experienced continued prosperity, even in the face of poor performance.126
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Causes of Low-Quality Ratings: Rating Transparency
Another vulnerability of CRAs concerns the transparency of their rating methodologies—
that is, the ability of outsiders to view and comprehend the models used in the rating process and
to discern just how the agencies arrive at the ratings they impart. Even after the Credit Rating
Agency Reform Act of 2006, passed in part to address such fears of opacity, CRAs were still
only required to provide a description of rating procedures and methodologies, as opposed to
disclosing substantive information on actual methods and models.127 Consequently, ratings
criteria often omitted important variables and assumptions and were not released ―up to a level of
replicability.‖128 When agency methodologies were disclosed, they often turned out to be
erroneous or outdated. One CRA compliance officer, in discussing how his firm‘s actual
processes for determining credit ratings diverged from its stated criteria, revealed:
Our published criteria as it currently stands is a bit too unwieldy and all over the
map in terms of being current or comprehensive. It might be too much of a stretch
to say that we’re complying with it because our SF [structured finance] rating
approach is inherently flexible and subjective, while much of our written criteria
is detailed and prescriptive. Doing a complete inventory of our criteria and
documenting all of the areas where it is out of date or inaccurate would appear to
be a huge job.129
Issues regarding performance transparency also existed. Many CRAs did not publish
verifiable or easily comparable historical data on rating performance, making it difficult for
customers to assess the accuracy of past ratings.130 Without informed views on the quality of a
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firm‘s credit ratings, users could not reasonably rely on them to make the investments they did.
Of course, for reasons previously stated—lack of competition among rating agencies, regulation
and industry practices that were dependent on ratings, etc.—it appears they had little choice.
On the flipside, while information pertaining to CRA credit ratings were not fully
transparent to their end users, rating agencies regularly supplied clients (the issuers of the
securities being rated) with various ―customer end‖ tools, which enabled them to run tests of
proposed securitization portfolios based on guidelines provided prior to rating. As long as an
issuer‘s offering adhered to the criteria in a relevant model, it could earn the desired rating,
regardless of any additional risk beyond the scope of the model. This practice of structuring to
rating was a dangerous one, as new issuances could be constructed with design features solely
intended to satisfy the requirements of narrow rating tests.131
Causes of Low-Quality Ratings: Conflicts of Interest
Other conflicts of interest arose regarding the issuer-pays model. While this conflict is
common to many gatekeepers, such as accounting firms, and not necessarily a definitive sign of
deficient independence, it occurred to a greater extent at CRAs, who did little to manage problem
areas. As competition dwindled and financial markets became more reliant on credit ratings,
CRAs successfully transitioned from a subscription model, wherein investors and other users of
rating information paid, to an arena in which issuers of securities funded their rating. Such a
compensation scheme raises fears that clients might offer to pay more for inflated ratings or, by
the same token, that rating agencies could threaten to issue damaging ratings unless sufficiently
remunerated. Moreover, CRAs earned 90% of their revenues from issuer-paid ratings,132 in
contrast to the Big 4 accounting firms, whose audit services account for less than half of total
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proceeds.133 These concerns were exacerbated by the fact that CRAs began providing an
increasing amount of ancillary services to their existing rating clients. In particular, all three
NRSROs offered risk management consulting, which included credit scoring models, internal
ratings systems services, and empirical data on default incidence, loss severity, and rating
transitions. They also marketed pre-rating assessments, which allowed issuers, for an additional
fee, to determine how a particular corporate action, like a merger or stock repurchase, would
affect their credit rating.134 But whereas accounting and securities research firms face new rules
and restrictions regarding such conflicts of interest, regulators did not place any limits on the
activities of rating agencies with respect to ancillary and consulting services.135
CRAs drew further negative attention by issuing unsolicited ratings. Standard & Poor‘s,
for instance, assigned and published ratings for all debt issues over $50 million, with or without
request from the issuer, ―as a matter of policy‖.136 There are several problems with this practice.
Ostensibly, CRAs appeared to be offering a public service by disseminating free information to
the investing community, and more information is generally useful in decision making.
However, in the case of unsolicited assessments, rating agencies were limited to publicly
available intelligence and could not have constructed ratings with the same quality as those for
clients or securities on which they possessed inside information. In fact, research has shown that
CRAs assign empirically lower unsolicited ratings than when hired and paid to do so.137 While
such adverse opinions may result from conservative assumptions regarding confidential
information, their publication may also serve as a ―veiled threat‖ from CRAs against issuers that
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do not pay for their services.138 In order to improve or correct a rating that it never requested, an
issuer may be obligated to hire the CRA responsible for its circulation.
Supplementary Causes of Low-Quality Ratings
The list of additional charges directed at rating agencies is extensive, but I will attempt to
summarize them briefly. Perhaps the most important criticism is that CRAs asserted that ratings
were intended to be consistent across different types of instruments, so that a rating of AAA
should have meant the same thing whether it was attached to a corporate bond or a complex
structured finance product. Investors may have been understandably attracted to the newer
issuances, which bore the same grade as, but promised greater returns than, their traditional
counterparts. The structured vehicles ultimately behaved much differently, however, with
defaults and downgrades occurring much more frequently.139 Studies carried out subsequent to
the credit crisis also revealed that CRAs had relied on flawed rating methodologies that took into
account neither the weakening of underwriting standards nor the correlation of defaults.140
Moreover, rating agencies performed inadequate due diligence concerning the quality of the
collateral pools underlying the rated securities, basing their findings on historical mortgage
default rates for similar pools instead of evaluating mortgages individually. This historical data
quickly became irrelevant as defaults reached unprecedented levels.141 At the same time,
institutional investors with the capacity to undertake their own credit analysis did not
independently examine structured products prior to investment, instead placing excessive
reliance on CRAs without fully understanding their methodologies.142
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Lastly, rating agencies possessed little incentive to ensure quality ratings because they
were largely able to escape liability. CRAs repeatedly asserted that their evaluations were
constitutionally protected opinions, and courts accepted this defense on numerous occasions,
implying that credit ratings could be issued without fear of litigation under the protection of the
First Amendment. Even if a credit rating was judged to be a (false) factual assertion, plaintiff
corporations were often considered to be public figures, which required them to show malice on
the part of the defendant—that is, to prove that a CRA had acted with reckless disregard to the
truth.143 The effective legal immunity of rating agencies is surprising given the limited degree to
which they sought to protect against falsehoods. Moody‘s, for example, in its Code of
Professional Conduct, described in no uncertain terms its indifference to ensuring the quality of
its ratings:
[Moody’s Investor Service] has no obligation to perform, and does not perform,
due diligence with respect to the accuracy of information it receives or obtains in
connection with the rating process. MIS does not independently verify any such
information. Nor does MIS audit or otherwise undertake to determine that such
information is complete. Thus, in assigning a Credit Rating, MIS is in no way
providing a guarantee or any kind of assurance with regard to the accuracy,
timeliness, or completeness of factual information reflected, or contained, in the
Credit Rating or any related MIS publication.144
Reasons for CRAs to sustain the structured finance market were numerous, while incentives to
promote quality credit ratings were scarce. Investors lured by assurances of creditworthiness and
promises of great returns ignored the considerable lack of competition and transparency and
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looked past potential conflicts of interest, making highly leveraged purchases of precarious
securities. Then, well, you know the rest.

V. DEREGULATION & FEDERAL OVERSIGHT
Much of what led to the bursting of the housing bubble and resulting devaluation of
asset-backed securities likely could have been prevented if certain actions had been prohibited by
law or at least closely monitored by those appointed to keep watch. Instead, regulators and
overseers elected to take a backseat in their supervisory roles, permitting unregulated credit
markets to produce and trade exotic mortgage products to the point where leverage surpassed
historic levels. First, Congress issued several edicts gradually returning more power to the parties
responsible for previous financial crises. Moreover, it repealed landmark legislation that had
been passed in response to the Great Depression and was intended to prevent familiar speculative
excesses that had been at the core of that banking failure. In addition, the Securities and
Exchange Commission allowed the largest investment banks to greatly increase their exposure to
structured finance products by reducing capital requirements and amplifying leverage. Finally,
legislators sanctioned self-regulation of over-the-counter derivatives, triggering precipitous
growth of the market for credit default swaps.
The Origins of Regulation & Financial Amnesia
The collapse of the United States stock market in 1929 and subsequent contagion to the
worldwide economy over the following decade convinced legislators that unregulated financial
markets could not be trusted to ensure economic stability and that the government should closely
monitor major financial institutions to prevent the excessive risk taking characteristic of
damaging boom and bust periods. In 1933, therefore, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt
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signed into law the Glass-Steagall Act, which separated the activities of investment and
commercial banks. Specifically, the act sought to prevent the use of banking deposits to finance
speculative capital market activity. The SEC was tasked with regulating investment banks by
requiring the publication of complete and dependable securities information. Moreover,
commercial banks were obligated to retain the consumer and commercial loans that they had
originated, which motivated them to avoid risky lending practices.145
Not surprisingly, as often happens after enough time elapses, memories of the reasons
behind the Great Depression faded, and serious policy discussions on the advantages of liberal
financial markets and innovative instruments commenced.146 Post-Keynesian macroeconomist
James Crotty conjectures that catastrophic economic and political events often lead to successful
attempts to tightly regulate the industries deemed responsible, but regulated firms ultimately
possess a strong incentive to try to weaken and evade their regulatory restraints.147 And so, over
the course of two decades of deregulation beginning in the 1980s, the United States grew into its
―new financial architecture‖ (NFA), one in which regulations were nonexistent, loosely enforced,
or designed favorably for financial institutions.148 Proponents of the NFA argued that capital
markets price securities correctly with respect to expected risk and return, enabling participants
to make optimal decisions and leading risk to be held only by those capable of managing it,
negating the need for significant government intervention.149 But this defense ignores the lessons
of history and rests on the now discredited assumption that all market players have access to all
information. As we have seen, securitization masked the extent of risk inherent to investments in
subprime loans, off-balance-sheet conduits concealed toxic assets from shareholders, and credit
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rating agencies did little to squelch conflicts of interest that disincentivized the formation of
high-quality ratings. Indeed, in testimony before the House of Representatives Oversight
Committee, former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan admitted that he and ―those of us
who have looked to the self-interest of lending institutions‖ found themselves in a ―state of
shocked disbelief‖ when confronted with the failing reality of the NFA.150
The Beginnings of Deregulation
Without the benefit of hindsight, legislators pushed ahead with their deregulation efforts
and in 1980 first set their sights on residential mortgage credit. At the time, policies aimed at
increasing the availability of credit seemed prudent. Annual inflation had climbed to 13.5%
(compared to an average of 2.6% from 2000 to 2009),151 mortgage interest rates towered at
13.74% (vs. 6.29% throughout the most recent decade),152 and states with strict usury limits
made credit conditions even tighter.153 Congress responded by passing the Depository
Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, which phased out government
imposed interest rate ceilings on first lien home mortgages, effectively repealing usury caps
imposed by individual states.154 Soon after, the Alternative Mortgage Transaction Parity Act of
1982 authorized the use of adjustable rate mortgages, balloon clauses, and negative amortization
loans and accorded to all mortgage financiers parity with federally chartered lenders.155
Together, these two acts created an environment in which even the riskiest of loan features could
be legally implemented to obscure the total cost of a loan.156 Exotic mortgages set buyers up for
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significant payment shock by requiring small payments to start while the newly dismantled
interest rate prohibitions could offer no protection against excessive resets.
Remaining tools for federal oversight were ineffective or underutilized, including two
laws designed to promote transparency in lending arrangements. The Truth in Lending Act of
1968, which had been enacted to protect consumers and enhance competition among creditors by
requiring uniform disclosures regarding loan costs, and the Real Estate Settlement Procedures
Act of 1974, passed with similar intent, have both been criticized for failing to ensure informed
comparison shopping due to the decreasing relevance of the required disclosures.157 In 1994,
Congress attempted to remedy some of its perceived regulatory weaknesses by ratifying the
Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act of 1994 (HOEPA). One of the law‘s chief
objectives was to temper the distribution of high-cost loans, which it endeavored to accomplish
by banning balloon payments and prepayment penalties, but the scope of loans affected by the
act was limited.158 First, HOEPA applied only to non-purchase money transactions, which
included home refinancing but not first time home purchases, reverse mortgages, or home equity
lines of credit.159 This meant that new subprime borrowers could still be subjected to the abuses
that HOEPA sought to eliminate. In addition, lenders found ways to circumvent the high-cost
loan provisions by slightly lowering interest rates and fees to below HOEPA‘s thresholds.160
Former Federal Reserve Governor Edward Gramlich revealed that although it was expected that
half of all subprime mortgage loans would be brought under HOEPA coverage, in reality the act
only covered one percent of the loan population.161 HOEPA did provide other, more expansive
means for policing lending practices. Specifically, it granted the Federal Reserve with a broad
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authority to prohibit unfair or deceptive loan terms in both the purchase and refinance markets,
regardless of interest rates or fees.162 Nevertheless, Chairman Greenspan declined to exercise that
authority.163 Criticism regarding the Fed‘s reluctance to intervene led Ben Bernanke,
Greenspan‘s successor, to finally implement comprehensive restrictions on loan abuses in 2008,
long after problems with subprime loans had become apparent.164
While federal regulators remained on the sidelines, many states enacted their own statutes
for keeping checks on the mortgage market. Before long, however, just like with what had
happened to state restrictions on usury and alternative mortgage products, the new statutes were
federally preempted. In 1996, the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), the federal branch
responsible for regulating thrift institutions, opined that federal savings and loan associations
were exempt from observing state lending laws.165 The decision did not relieve national banks,
state thrifts, or independent nonbank mortgage lenders from state directives, though, and these
institutions were increasingly targeted beginning in 1999 when North Carolina introduced
comprehensive anti-predatory lending legislation.166 Georgia and thirty other states followed suit,
each passing a version of a HOEPA-fix that expanded coverage and imposed more stringent
restrictions on lender behavior.167 But in 2004, as perhaps should have been expected, the Office
of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the regulator of national banks and non-thrifts, issued
a proclamation declaring that its member firms, too, were not bound by state laws.168 It should be
noted that the revenues of OTS and OCC derive almost exclusively from the entities that they
regulate, thus both agencies had an incentive to appease their constituent institutions through
162

―Encouraging Responsible Mortgage Lending: Prospective Rulemaking Initiatives‖
―The Financial Crisis and the Role of Federal Regulators‖
164
―Greenspan's Folly‖
165
―Federal Preemption of State Prepayment-Penalty Statutes: The OTS Reverses Itself‖
166
Quercia
167
Whalen
168
Bagley
163

42

federal preemption for fear that a federal thrift might defect to national bank status or vice
versa.169 At any rate, the decision to favor federal regulations over state rulings would not have
been so contentious had federal regulators enforced comparable guidelines or provided the same
level of oversight. Instead, the OTS merely issued non-binding advisory letters that were
routinely dismissed as ―suggestions‖.170 The sole rule adopted by the OCC, meanwhile, which
prohibited the issuance of mortgage loans to unqualified borrowers, turned out to be vague in
design and execution.171 In the words of Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission Chairman Phil
Angelides, federal regulators ―tied the hands of the states‖ and then ―sat on [their own]
hands.‖172
The Makings of a Crisis
While lack of oversight can be challenging to prove, federal agencies also made three
verifiable changes to the financial landscape that have been linked to the recent crisis. First, at
the turn of the millennium, President Clinton certified the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial
Services Modernization Act of 1999, repealing the section of the Glass-Steagall Act that had
mandated the separation of commercial and investment banking activities.173 Recall that GlassSteagall was drafted in response to the Great Depression, which resulted partly from the illadvised investment of banking deposits. Nevertheless, in a study requisitioned by Congress to
consider whether the separation should be upheld, the case against preserving Glass-Steagall
contended: ―The securities activities that depository institutions are seeking are both low-risk by
their very nature, and would reduce the total risk of organizations offering them -- by
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diversification.‖174 Hopefully this claim has been sufficiently debunked. Nobel Prize winning
economist Joseph Stiglitz added that repeal of Glass-Steagall led to a significant culture change:
Commercial banks are not supposed to be high-risk ventures; they are supposed
to manage other people’s money very conservatively. It is with this understanding
that the government agrees to pick up the tab should they fail. Investment banks,
on the other hand, have traditionally managed rich people’s money, people who
can take bigger risks in order to get bigger returns. When repeal of GlassSteagall brought investment and commercial banks together, the investment-bank
culture came out on top.175
Following passage of Gramm-Leach-Bliley, that culture change manifested itself in the form of
several enormous mergers that either occurred for the first time (Bank of America with Fleet
Bank) or were made permanent (Citibank with Smith Barney, Shearson, Primerica, and Travelers
Insurance), creating massive financial services companies with access to capital through means
other than traditional bank deposits, like borrowing.
And borrow those conglomerates did. In fact, the second concrete step taken by
regulators that led to the excesses responsible for the crisis was the SEC‘s 2004 decision to relax
its rule setting minimum capital requirements for certain investment banks. Before the
amendment, broker-dealers were subject to stringent rules limiting leverage ratios to no more
than 15:1.176 The change, however, permitted broker-dealers that were part of consolidated
supervised entities to adopt voluntary, alternative methods of computing deductions to net capital
using internal mathematical models.177 Leverage ratios limit how much debt a company may
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assume for every dollar it has in equity. Lower leverage ratios and higher capital requirements
mean that firms must maintain more resources for buffering against losses, but the new net
capital rule allowed investment banks with assets in excess of $5 billion and that consented to
SEC supervision to unshackle funds previously held in reserve.178 Unfortunately, the SEC
eventually conceded that the results of its rule change ―made it abundantly clear that voluntary
regulation does not work.‖179 The country‘s largest investment banks, meanwhile, took full
advantage of the modification and began piling on debt. Merrill Lynch‘s debt-to-equity ratio, for
instance, nearly doubled from 15:1 in 2003 to 28:1 in 2007 while the leverage ratios of Morgan
Stanley and Goldman Sachs grew to 33:1 and 28:1, respectively.180 By 2008, each of the five
biggest broker-dealers had either met its demise or neared collapse. Bear Stearns received a $29
billion bailout and was sold for cheap to JPMorgan, Merrill Lynch sold itself to Bank of
America, Lehman Brothers was allowed to fail, and Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley
converted to commercial bank status to gain permanent access to the Fed‘s discount window.181
Hard times were made worse because the firms had used their extremely leveraged
positions to purchase highly speculative instruments, notably credit default swaps, which were
traded to insure mortgage-backed securities. CDS are derivatives with features of commodities,
securities, and insurance, but Congress and regulatory agencies have created exceptions
exempting CDS from any of those regulatory regimes. In 1989, 1992, and 1993, the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission first approved rules to excuse some swaps from commodities
regulation.182 Years later, the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 clarified that the
derivatives would be regulated as neither futures under the Commodities Exchange Act nor
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securities under federal securities law.183 Interestingly, the act was backed by Senator Phil
Gramm, who was also co-sponsor of Gramm-Leach-Bliley and who, according to federal
records, was the top recipient of campaign contributions from commercial banks and in the top
five for donations from Wall Street from 1989 to 2002.184 The exemptions kept CDS out of
exchanges and in over-the-counter markets, where a lack of a reliable central repository of
information made it challenging for traders of CDS to determine how exposed the parties on the
other side of the transactions were.185 Unchecked, the market for swaps grew sharply, nearly
doubling in size each year from 2005 to 2008 and creating a completely interconnected financial
arena as issuers of CDS acquired insurance of their own.186 CDS were ultimately to blame for the
troubles faced by AIG, which had sold commitments of protection on roughly $500 billion worth
of securities but which, under the terms of its sales, was not compelled to post collateral as long
as the firm remained highly rated and the value of the underlying securities did not decline.187
When AIG failed to satisfy either requirement, it lacked sufficient capital to cover margin calls
on its CDS until it found salvation in the form of a $150 billion federal bailout.188
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